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Euro-Med 
European Ambitions in the Mediterranean 
Sheila Carapico 
The European Union is carving out a sphere of potentially vast influence in the Euro-Mediterranean basin, while 
also cultivating special relationships further south in the Arabian Peninsula. European ambitions do not directly 
challenge US security policy in the Middle East. Rather, they parallel US interests in the Caribbean Basin and 
Latin America: for a large regional free trade zone open to imports and foreign investment. 
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ost Americans and many Arabs, Israelis, Turks and 
Europeans think of Uncle Sam as the superpower in 
the Middle East-an avuncular hegemon, waging 
peace and war, picking favorites and ostracizing errants, dis- 
bursing guns here and butter there. Certainly, this image of a 
Goliath casting a shadow from the Straits of Gibraltar to the 
Straits of Hormuz is more than a mirage. American invest- 
ments in Arab oil, Arab petro-investments in the US and the 
penetration of Middle Eastern markets by American firms 
are all significant. The US sells more weapons-and sends 
more economic aid-to the Middle East than to any other 
region. US battle readiness and strategic advantage from the 
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf are unrivaled. Over the 
last decade, the US has intervened ostentatiously in the region's 
hot spots, and the US continues to rattle its sabers ominously 
from time to time. So Yankees are widely regarded as the power 
brokers in the entirety of the Middle East and North Africa. 
Look out, Uncle Sam, the Europeans are coming. What 
used to be the European Economic Community (EEC) 
formed the European Union in 1992, creating the world's 
largest, most powerful supra-national federation of sover- 
eign states. Pursuing economic integration, enlargement and 
common foreign policy initiatives, the European Union is 
carving out a new sphere of potentially vast influence in 
what it calls the Euro-Mediterranean basin (Euro-Med), 
while also cultivating special relationships further south in 
the Arabian Peninsula. Euro-Med does not directly chal- 
lenge US policies in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Rather, Europe's ambitions south and east of the Mediterra- 
nean parallel US interests in the Caribbean Basin and Latin 
America: for a large regional free trade zone open to imports 
and foreign investment. If successful in its expansive aims, 
the multifaceted Euro-Med project could very well be a force 
for the twenty-first century. 
Euro-Med Engagement 
The 27-member Euro-Med Partnership, launched at the 
much-ballyhooed Barcelona Conference in 1995, consists 
of three "baskets." The economic basket is paramount. Aim- 
ing to establish a Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010, 
the 15 members of the European Union promised aid 
through the Mediterranean Development Assistance 
(MEDA) program in exchange for market reforms. The stra- 
tegic basket, whose ultimate goal is the creation of a "com- 
mon area of peace and stability," has started slowly, with 
some statements and initiatives on human rights and politi- 
cal reforms. Although under-funded in comparison to 
MEDA, the multidimensional socio-cultural basket of re- 
search, conferences and projects on Mediterranean antiqui- 
ties, history, ecology, contemporary arts and the like seems 
to have captured intellectual imagination-as well as com- 
mercial interest-especially in France, Spain and Italy. 
There are three concentric circles of Euro-Med engage- 
ment. Three aspirants to full-fledged membership in the 
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European Union-Cyprus, Malta and Turkey-are assessed 
periodically for their progress toward meeting a range of EU 
accession criteria, including human rights standards.' The 
12 partners in the envisioned Mediterranean free trade zone 
are these three plus Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria.2 All 
of these have signed or are negotiating association agree- 
ments. Beyond the Mediterranean basin, Brussels is also 
negotiating a free trade agreement with the Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council (GCC), itself a free trade zone comprised of 
the Gulf monarchies.3 
The impetus for the Barcelona Process, as Euro-Med is 
also known, came from several directions simultaneously. 
After the formation of the World Trade Organization, the 
European Community hoped to enhance markets and in- 
vestments in foreign countries close to home. Xenophobes 
fearful that Arabs and Turks will overrun a continent were 
crying for policies to stem immigration, while the deterio- 
rating situation in Algeria in the mid-1990s raised the spec- 
ter of Islamist radicalism spilling into Europe. In addition, 
French and British colonial legacies and Italian, Spanish and 
Greek merchant empires underlie particular interests that 
those countries hoped to advance via Euro-Med engagement. 
At the same time, their preferences for programs in the newly 
independent states notwithstanding, northern European 
companies sought direct outlets to the Mediterranean re- 
gion. Lastly, of course, North Africa is both a source of pe- 
troleum for Europe and its gateway to more oil in the Persian 
Gulf. 
Invitation to an Elite Party 
It has also been suggested that after the US seized the peace 
process from Europe at Madrid and Oslo, the Euro-Med 
conferences served as an alternative to the moribund multi- 
lateral tracks of the US-orchestrated Arab-Israeli negotia- 
tions. Every US administration has favored one-on-one 
bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, 
and a focus on this conflict even to the exclusion of other 
issues. Washington puts most of its eggs in a few baskets, 
with generous aid to Israel and Egypt and a special security 
relationship with Saudi Arabia. If the US tends toward uni- 
lateral policies and bilateral approaches, the Euro-Med frame- 
work is inherently multilateral. Euro-Med invites everyone 
to an elite party, casting a broader and potentially more vi- 
able net around issues of common concern like the environ- 
ment, shipping and communications. 
The total European Union budget for spending in the 12 
Mediterranean countries has been running at nearly a bil- 
lion euros per year, including MEDA grants, loans from the 
European Investment Bank and other sources. Some 86 per- 
cent of these funds are spent on classical economic develop- 
ment projects and/or support for structural adjustment in 
the low- and middle-income countries of the Arab Mediter- 
ranean. The remainder goes toward Euro-Med activities in- 
volving most or all partners, including summits and 
conferences. A billion euros a year is modest compared with 
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some five billion dollars in annual US aid to Israel and Egypt, 
but its wider distribution buys the Union more regional eco- 
nomic leverage. Particularly in North Africa and in Leba- 
non-Syria, European consultants and brands are 
conspicuous. Whereas US aid includes military as well as 
economic assistance, all EU assistance 
is for civilian purposes. So the EU can 
legitimately claim to be the largest 
provider of development assistance to The EU can the needy countries of the southern 
Mediterranean, and the main source claim to be 
of non-military funding for the provider of 
Middle East peace process. 
Despite their qualms about sitting assistance 
down together, Middle Eastern gov- 
ernments have strong incentives to countries of 
enter multilateral trade talks with Mediterrane 
virtually all of Europe. Turkey e e ane 
groused about seating a "terrorist" 
state, Syria, and complains that 
Greek malfeasance is blocking its 
accession bid, but neither Turkey, nor Israel, nor any Arab 
Mediterranean state except Libya is likely to decline an 
invitation to participate, even as a junior partner, in the 
European club. Greeks, Turks and Cypriots, and Israelis 
and Arabs, have all participated in large-scale talks on a 
wide array of subjects, even security issues.4 
Bureaucrats and Business Concerns 
Often dismissed in the US press as the bumbling bureau- 
crats of Brussels, the EU has indeed not launched Euro- 
Med with great speed or skill. After several missteps, MEDA 
I was redesigned to match the structure and function of 
the larger program (known by the acronym PHARE) to 
promote post-communist transitions to capitalism in Cen- 
tral and Eastern Europe. Its complex and ambitious Pro- 
gram for Decentralized Cooperation, designed to promote 
multiple linkages between European and Arab towns (Euro- 
Med Urbs), universities (Euro-Med Campus) and media 
(Euro-Med Media), initially faltered on sheer logistics.5 In 
early 2001, MEDA II and other programs were placed 
under the Europe-Aid Cooperation Office, established in 
2001 to rationalize the EU's foreign aid programs. In the 
meantime, the Balkan morass claimed ever more resources, 
the significant package of assistance to the Palestinian Au- 
thority was suspended for at least six months in 2000-01 
and the relative unity of Barcelona dissipated amidst de- 
bates on the common currency, expansion, immigration 
and other matters. 
Such problems notwithstanding, Euro-Med is building 
a vast network of ministerial summits and lower-level part- 
nerships in every sector imaginable, from agriculture to 
zoology and space technology to micro-credit. There are 
meetings every month of youth, women, union leaders, 
journalists, scientists, businesses, bankers, diplomats or bu- 






most productive in the least political areas of narrow com- 
mon concern, such as among marine ecologists, tourism 
companies, Francophone filmmakers and aficionados of 
Roman or Moorish design. Talks on broader, heavier is- 
sues like terrorism, smuggling, immigration and protec- 
tionism have made little progress. 
Certainly, the peace initiatives de- 
signed to bring Israel together with legitimately its four immediate neighbors under 
the Euro-Med framework (dubbed the largest Peace-Media, Peace-Urbs and 
ieelopment Peace-Campus) had scarcely gotten Vle oUpmII ni off the drawing tables when the last 
o the needy of the Clinton peace efforts failed in the summer of 2000. Paltry the southern though their fruits have been dur- 
ing the past five years, over the next 1 n. cycle the multilateral conversations 
of Euro-Med may well produce 
something greater than the sum of 
their parts. After enough conven- 
tions, declarations and organizations have been established 
in the Euro-Med framework, a Euro-Mediterranean basin 
with strategic, economic and cultural (as well as ecologi- 
cal) dimensions may begin to take shape.6 
European commercial interests are already being advanced 
through Euro-Med, both directly through European Com- 
mission contracts for MEDA projects (some 80 major ten- 
ders a year) and indirectly through commercial opportunities 
such as technology sales and financial services. If and when 
Euro-Invest really gets off the ground, exponential growth 
in such opportunities is predicted. Outside government and 
business circles, universities, think tanks and advocacy groups 
throughout the EU have discovered a potentially lucrative 
pot of Euro-Med grant money, access to which, according 
to some small European NGOs, is gained via a trendy cock- 
tail circuit. 
Conflicting Objectives 
Liberal rhetoric about partnership and popular participa- 
tion is not necessarily borne out in practice, for Euro-Med 
contains a number of contradictory goals and conflicts of 
interest. The oft-stated objectives of "decentralized coop- 
eration" in the civic realm and at the grassroots level seem at 
odds with the highly centralized implication of national se- 
curity officers in the Euro-Med dialogue.7 Far from advanc- 
ing democracy and stability in the short term, structural 
adjustment policies threaten to exacerbate social inequali- 
ties and resentments. 
Certain progressive tendencies seem built into the Euro- 
Med framework. In the area of democracy promotion, for 
instance, European social democratic parties have been more 
inclined than their Christian Democratic counterparts to 
seek MEDA grants for dialogue with Arab political forces. 
Some connections among international labor unions have 
been solidified already under Euro-Med. The discourses of 
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internationalism, feminism, environmentalism, human 
rights activism and sympathy for Palestinian victims of Is- 
raeli occupation are deeply embedded in European foreign 
policy pronouncements. Europeans like to see and portray 
themselves as possessing a moral leadership that disdains US 
militarism and imperialism. With the Bush administration 
retrenching on matters from global warming to the death 
penalty to Iraq sanctions to non-proliferation, this sense of 
relative self-righteousness swells. Per- 
haps naively, Europeans in the 
Middle East imagine themselves im- 
mune to what they hope are purely Clearly, Eu 
anti-American sentiments. based on a I 
But clearly, the relationship be- 
tween the 15 EU members and their North-South 
12 Mediterranean partners is based 
on a hierarchical North-South or 
core-periphery dynamic. With the 
exception of Israel, there are vast disparities in wealth be- 
tween Europe and the lower Mediterranean. As in NAFTA, 
the free trade zone of the Americas, Southern countries worry 
that benefits will inevitably drift from the poorer countries 
to the capitalist core. Turkish, Egyptian and Moroccan ne- 
gotiators have expressed alarm over the dangers of unequal 
exchange, pointing to the European intention of removing 
tariffs on services and most manufactures without concomi- 
tant attention to the terms of trade in food and textiles. A 
further measure of asymmetry is the southward flow of capital 
and the northward migration of labor.8 
Whereas southern Mediterranean countries must un- 
dertake many reforms as a price of admission to the Eu- 
ropean club, some Middle Easterners contend, European 
nations make few if any concessions in return. Moreover, 
although the thrust of Euro-Med is multilateral, each 
Mediterranean partner negotiates separately with the 
whole European Community on trade issues, giving the 
latter an overwhelming advantage.9 Such asymmetries 
guaranteed a Spanish victory in its dispute with Morocco 
over fishing rights, for instance.1? The EU charged so- 
called "dumping levies" on Egypt and Turkey for alleg- 
edly selling shirts in Europe below cost-an option hardly 
open to Cairo or Ankara to redress perceived European 
protectionism.1 Moroccans are instructed "to open up 
the economy, to destroy certain economic sectors, to free 
the media of government control and to radically alter 
traditional values," one professor told an interviewer. A 
union representative added that "the EU is locked into a 
certain reform ideology that offers only frustration and 
dissatisfaction. 12 
Cause of Controversy 
Aid packages and hefty infrastructural investments have 
wooed select ministries, business interests and research 
institutions in Israel, Turkey and several Arab countries 
to Euro-Med. Certain sectors-telecommunications and 
tourism are good examples-expect significant growth. 
II 
I 
Middle Eastern think tanks, universities and liberal NGOs 
have also been beneficiaries of European (as well as Ameri- 
can) grants and contracts, while the intellectual elite at- 
tend more and more Euro-Med conferences. 
Indeed, Western grants for studies, seminars and publi- 
cations often critical of Arab regimes have become increas- 
ingly controversial as governments themselves dependent on 
foreign aid object to the flow of resources to non-govern- 
mental entities. On the one hand, re- 
gional governments raise some 
legitimate concerns about violations of 
ro- M ed Is the traditional bounds of sovereignty; ierarchical on the other hand, their actions belie 
verbal commitments to respect basic 
dyna m ic freedoms of expression and association. 
Recognizing both implicit funder biases 
in the kinds of research supported and 
the dangers of prosecution, some West- 
ern-educated intellectuals have concluded that the costs of 
foreign funding outweigh the rewards. 
Other regional actors-particularly forces in opposi- 
tion to the regimes-remain skeptical of European mo- 
tivations. Europe is hardly without its own colonial 
history and hegemonic aspirations in North Africa, the 
Arab east and the Arabian Peninsula. Balfour betrayals, 
the 1956 Suez invasion and the Battle of Algiers remain 
vivid in the collective historical memory. Today, as Turks, 
Kurds, Berbers and Arabs face religious and ethnic dis- 
crimination in France, Germany and much of the rest 
of Europe, some critics insist that European proselytiz- 
ing about human rights is not always matched by fair 
treatment of immigrants and their children. Spain re- 
cently enacted a draconian "alien status" law seemingly 
aimed at North Africans. 
Arabs generalize about the West as much as Westerners 
generalize about Islam. Currently, Arab nationalists as well 
as Islamists tend to view Europe and North America as a 
NATO-Washington consensus bloc. Europe is seen less as a 
counterweight to US hegemony than as a conspirator in a 
Western cultural project. Even if Europeans are more sym- 
pathetic to the plight of Palestinians and Iraqis than US 
policymakers, neither the EU acting as a whole nor Europe's 
major individual actors (Britain, France and Germany) of- 
fer alternatives to US policies. 
Still on the Sidelines? 
Though they ostensibly share a common foreign policy, the 
15 EU states neither speak with one voice nor share identi- 
cal interests vis-a-vis the Mediterranean region. Northern 
Europe sees the Mediterranean differently than southern 
Europe. The large and small countries within Europe may 
have diverging or even competing commercial concerns. 
Northern European countries like Ireland and Germany are 
seeking foreign workers even as Spain seeks to keep them 
out, for instance. Not everyone is keen to invest in a zone of 
turmoil. Moreover, as in North America, some European 
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industries fear that jobs will be exported to low-wage zones 
overseas. 
European Union members have different perspectives on 
their relationship to US policy, too, especially in the secu- 
rity arena. To date, NATO has overridden the EU: Britain 
and the continental powers have respected US management 
of Israeli-Arab negotiations and the isolation of Iraq, Libya 
and Iran. However much Europeans decry the utter failures 
of the US "peace process" and "dual containment" strate- 
gies, and think they could draw up better plans for brokering 
Israeli withdrawal from Palestine and tapping Iraqi oil, they 
show no sign of moving from the sidelines in these matters. 
Criticisms notwithstanding, there remain many arenas of 
cooperation between Europe and America.13 
Europe is not going to influence economic, political and 
social circumstances in the Middle East and North Africa 
simply by declaring an intention to do so. The EU seems 
unlikely to tackle US security policy head on, in either the 
Arab-Israeli conflict or the Gulf, and there is scant indica- 
tion that the US feels threatened by European initiatives in 
the region. But Washington is chasing twentieth-century 
demons into the twenty-first century. Its current policies, 
fixated on World War II, the Cold War and the 1970s oil 
embargo, are obsessed with sacrosanct borders and mutu- 
ally exclusive conceptions of sovereignty. America's double- 
minded insistence on peace with Israel and war with Iraq 
defies economic or strategic logic. Neither continued lop- 
sided regional arms proliferation nor the indefinite perpetu- 
ation of political trade embargoes make sense today. By 
contrast, a European policy that simply approaches its south- 
ern flank in a "normal" way, looking forward rather than 
backward, searching for multilateral and bilateral agreements 
on trade, cultural exchanges, security consultations and other 
matters, could well be an advantageous policy for the com- 
ing decades. In this sense, the Mediterranean basin could 
emerge as a sub-region of the global economy under the 
influence of an expanding Europe. X 
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